UTI: Citater

Blufærdighed

2007-03-22 by N.N.

“Sådan vil ædle sjæle det: de vil intet have omkostningsfrit, allermindst livet.

Den, der er af pøblen, vil leve omkostningsfrit: men alle vi andre, som livet gav sig til – vi grunder altid over, hvad vi bedst giver til gengæld.

Og sandelig er det en fornem tale, der siger: “Hvad livet giver os, det vil vi – holde over for livet!”

Man skal ikke ville nyde, hvor man ikke giver noget at nyde. Og – man skal ikke ville nyde!

Nydelse og uskyld er nemlig det mest blufærdige, der findes: ingen af dem vil opsøges. Man skal have dem – og snarere bør man søge efter skyld og smerte!”

— Friedrich Nietzsche: Således talte Zarathustra. Kbh. 1999. s. 170

Der christliche Gottesbegriff

2006-09-22 by Admin

“Der christliche Gottesbegriff—Gott als Krankengott, Gott als Spinne, Gott als Geist—ist einer der korruptesten Gottesbegriffe, die auf Erden erreicht worden sind; er stellt vielleicht selbst den Pegel des Tiefstands in der absteigenden Entwicklung des Götter-Typus dar. Gott zum Widerspruch des Lebens abgeartet, statt dessen Verklärung und ewiges Ja zu sein! In Gott dem Leben, der Natur, dem Willen zum Leben die Feindschaft angesagt! Gott die Formel für jede Verleumdung des “Diesseits,” für jede Lüge vom “Jenseits”! In Gott das Nichts vergöttlicht, der Wille zum Nichts heilig gesprochen! …”

“The Christian concept of a god—the god as the patron of the sick, the god as a spinner of cobwebs, the god as a spirit—is one of the most corrupt concepts that has ever been set up in the world: it probably touches low–water mark in the ebbing evolution of the god–type. God degenerated into the contradiction of life. Instead of being its transfiguration and eternal Yea! In him war is declared on life, on nature, on the will to live! God becomes the formula for every slander upon the “here and now,” and for every lie about the “beyond”! In him nothingness is deified, and the will to nothingness is made holy!…”

— Friedrich Nietzsche: Der Antichrist §18; orig. og i Menckens overs.

Motto

2006-07-14 by N.N.

“En Kraft, der altid
tør kaste Stenen.
En Vaar, der altid
har Blad paa Grenen.

Saaledes staar han
i Middagsgløden –
saaledes staa han
i Aftenrøden.”

… skrev Thøger Larsen engang.

Viljens Frihed

2006-06-06 by Admin

“There’s no free will,” says the philosopher;
“To hang is most unjust.”
“There is no free will,” assents the officer;
“We hang because we must.”

— Bierce: Epigrams

At være en kvinde

2006-03-22 by N.N.

“At være en Qvinde er noget saa besynderligt, saa blandet, saa sammensat, at intet Prædicat udtrykker det, og at de mange Prædicater, hvis man vilde bruge dem, sige hinanden imod paa en Maade, saa kun en Qvinde kan udholde det, ja hvad værre er finde sig lykkelig derved. At hun i Virkeligheden betyder mindre end Manden, er ikke hendes Ulykke, end mindre hvis hun fik det at vide, thi det lader sig jo udholde, nei Ulykken er, at hendes Liv i den romantiske Bevidsthed er blevet meningsløst, saa hun det ene Øieblik betyder Alt, i det næste slet Intet, uden nogensinde at faae at vide, hvad hun dog egentligen har at betyde, og dog er dette ikke Ulykken, men væsentligen er den den, at hun ikke kan faae det at vide, fordi hun er Qvinde. Jeg for mit Vedkommende, hvis jeg var Qvinde, vilde hellere være det i Orienten, hvor jeg var Slavinde; thi at være Slavinde, hverken mere eller mindre, er dog altid Noget i Sammenligning med at være hu hei og ingen Ting.”

— Kierkegaard: SLV, SV3 bd. 7, s. 54

Of the Cases in which we may put Men to Death without incurring the Guilt of Murder

2005-09-27 by N.N.

"However, there are some exceptions made by the divine authority to its own law, that men may not be put to death. These exceptions are of two kinds, being justified either by a general law, or by a special commission granted for a time to some individual. And in this latter case, he to whom authority is delegated, and who is but the sword in the hand of him who uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he deals. And, accordingly, they who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." Abraham indeed was not merely deemed guiltless of cruelty, but was even applauded for his piety, because he was ready to slay his son in obedience to God, not to his own passion. And it is reasonably enough made a question, whether we are to esteem it to have been in compliance with a command of God that Jephthah killed his daughter, because she met him when he had vowed that he would sacrifice to God whatever first met him as he returned victorious from battle. Samson, too, who drew down the house on himself and his foes together, is justified only on this ground, that the Spirit who wrought wonders by him had given him secret instructions to do this. With the exception, then, of these two classes of cases, which are justified either by a just law that applies generally, or by a special intimation from God Himself, the fountain of all justice, whoever kills a man, either himself or another, is implicated in the guilt of murder."

— Augustine: The City of God. 1.21 (trans: Marcus Dods)

Of the End of this Life

2005-09-24 by N.N.

"But, it is added, many Christians were slaughtered, and were put to death in a hideous variety of cruel ways. Well, if this be hard to bear, it is assuredly the common lot of all who are born into this life. Of this at least I am certain, that no one has ever died who was not destined to die some time. Now the end of life puts the longest life on a par with the shortest. For of two things which have alike ceased to be, the one is not better, the other worse—the one greater, the other less. And of what consequence is it what kind of death puts an end to life, since he who has died once is not forced to go through the same ordeal a second time? And as in the daily casualties of life every man is, as it were, threatened with numberless deaths, so long as it remains uncertain which of them is his fate, I would ask whether it is not better to suffer one and die, than to live in fear of all? I am not unaware of the poor-spirited fear which prompts us to choose rather to live long in fear of so many deaths, than to die once and so escape them all; but the weak and cowardly shrinking of the flesh is one thing, and the well-considered and reasonable persuasion of the soul quite another. That death is not to be judged an evil which is the end of a good life; for death becomes evil only by the retribution which follows it. They, then, who are destined to die, need not be careful to inquire what death they are to die, but into what place death will usher them. And since Christians are well aware that the death of the godly pauper whose sores the dogs licked was far better than of the wicked rich man who lay in purple and fine linen, what harm could these terrific deaths do to the dead who had lived well?"

— Augustine: The City of God. 1.11 (trans: Marcus Dods)

Of Suicide committed through Fear of Punishment or Dishonour

2005-09-22 by N.N.

"And consequently, even if some of these virgins killed themselves to avoid such disgrace, who that has any human feeling would refuse to forgive them? And as for those who would not put an end to their lives, lest they might seem to escape the crime of another by a sin of their own, he who lays this to their charge as a great wickedness is himself not guiltless of the fault of folly. For if it is not lawful to take the law into our own hands, and slay even a guilty person, whose death no public sentence has warranted, then certainly he who kills himself is a homicide, and so much the guiltier of his own death, as he was more innocent of that offence for which he doomed himself to die. Do we justly execrate the deed of Judas, and does truth itself pronounce that by hanging himself he rather aggravated than expiated the guilt of that most iniquitous betrayal, since, by despairing of God's mercy in his sorrow that wrought death, he left to himself no place for a healing penitence? How much more ought he to abstain from laying violent hands on himself who has done nothing worthy of such a punishment! For Judas, when he killed himself, killed a wicked man; but he passed from this life chargeable not only with the death of Christ, but with his own: for though he killed himself on account of his crime, his killing himself was another crime. Why, then, should a man who has done no ill do ill to himself, and by killing himself kill the innocent to escape another's guilty act, and perpetrate upon himself a sin of his own, that the sin of another may not be perpetrated on him?"

— Augustine: The City of God. 1.17 (trans: Marcus Dods)

At have en sag

2005-09-22 by N.N.

“Det er faldet mig paa, om ikke her atter stikker et Hykkelsk i denne megen Tale om at have en Sag, at være en alvorlig Mand, der har en Sag o: s: v:.

Jo ganske vist. Sagen er den, Ingen tør i vor Tid være Person; den ene er saa bange for »de Andre« at han ikke ɔ: at Ingen tør være et Jeg. Msk-Frygt er det Dominerende; og som jo allerede Oldtiden (Aristoteles etsteds i Politik eller Ethik) har sagt: Tyrannie og Demokratiehade hinanden ligesom den ene Pottemager hader den anden, det er, det er samme Regjeringsform, kun at i Tyranniet er Een, i Demokratiet de Mange Tyrannen.

Men tilbage til det at have Sag. Man tør ikke af Frygt for de Andre være Jeg, derfor stræber man at blive et | Upersonligt, blive en Sag, Sagen, et Princip o: s: v:.

Dette har saa igjen ført til Anonymitet. I saa smaa Forhold som de danske er Anonymitet næsten nødvendig, hvis Misundelsen og de Manges Tyrannie ikke altfor stærkt skal sættes i Bevægelse.

Alt tenderer til at afskaffe Personlighed; men naturligviis skeer det under det hykkelske Opspind, at det naturligviis er et stort Fremskridt, at det er en ganske anderledes Alvor end da der var Jeg’er og Personlighed.

Hvor hykkelsk! Nei, det er Cujonerie, og tillige er det Klynkerie, for nemlig altid at kunne være Flere – og man tør aldrig være alene, aldrig være Jeg. Men naar det er »Sag«, saa er det jo strax Flere – saa man da fremfor Alt er sikkret for den Fare man i vor usle, usle demoraliserede Tid meest frygter for: at være ene, et eensomt Jeg.”

— Kierkegaard: NB29:2

Alderdom

2005-03-22 by Admin

“I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is—I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles,—are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men’s characters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.”

— Platon: Staten 329a (tr: Jowett)